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Lots of Blame, Little Proof - Mexico's Cartels Behind Violence in Ecuador?

 

Lots of Blame, Little Proof - Mexico's Cartels Behind Violence in Ecuador?

After yet another prison massacre, Ecuadorean authorities have doubled down on Mexico’s two biggest cartels being behind gang warfare in the South American nation by providing weapons and cash to their chosen partners.

On November 12 and 13, riots at the Litoral prison in the southern port city of Guayaquil left at least 68 inmates dead and 25 more injured. This was the third large-scale massacre in Ecuador this year, with prison violence having killed over 320 people in 2021 alone, mainly at Litoral.

The wave of violence has been sparked by a civil war among the Choneros – once Ecuador’s largest gang and a trusted transporter of cocaine shipments for Colombian and Mexican groups – and several rivals, including the Lobos, Tiguerones, Chone Killers and Lagartos.

For the government, the conflict has been worsened by the involvement of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, backing the Choneros, and the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG), supporting its rivals.

“We are no longer facing common delinquents but the largest drug cartels in the entire world,” said President Guillermo Lasso in an address to the nation on November 15, adding that “Ecuador finds itself under a severe external attack by drug trafficking mafias.”

For Mario Pazmiño, Ecuador’s former head of intelligence, the culprits are clear. “Violence spiked when local criminal gangs started working for the rival Mexican Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation drug cartels,” he told The Guardian.

“The level of corruption is so high that the prison staff and officers are totally corrupted and the prisoners run the jail,” he added.

InSight Crime Analysis

The actual scale of the involvement of Mexico’s leading cartels in Ecuador is difficult to prove as it has been in much of the region.

The arsenals of high-caliber weaponry finding their way to the Choneros and Lobos and the connections needed to move the colossal quantities of cocaine going through Ecuador certainly point to cooperation.

In recent years, before the explosion in violence, the Choneros had a known partnership with the Sinaloa Cartel, moving cocaine from the Colombian border to Guayaquil and other port cities for the Mexican group.

It is also highly plausible that the CJNG made alliances with the Choneros’ rivals and helped arm them to fight for control of Ecuador’s best drug trafficking routes.

SEE ALSO: Ecuador’s Prison Slaughterhouse a Warning to Rest of Latin America

“Some level of cooperation is clear,” said one government source in Guayaquil, who requested anonymity due to security reasons. “Small go-fast boats and planes are leaving filled with drugs and coming back full of money and weapons.”

InSight Crime has previously reported on Telmo Castro, the Sinaloa Cartel’s “man in Ecuador” who was integral at setting up the cocaine pipeline between the Mexican gang and Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC).

Castro worked with Jorge Cifuentes, a senior Sinaloa operative, to build clandestine runways, set up drug flights and create semi-permanent infrastructure.

After Castro was murdered, also in Guayaquil’s Litoral Prison in December 2019, InSight Crime’s investigation found that the Sinaloa Cartel shifted away from fixed operators in Ecuador. Instead, they sent in small groups of brokers who would set up trafficking logistics with groups and then leave. The CJNG could be doing the the same, given its reach and financing.

Recent arrests of Mexican nationals in Ecuador confirm drug trafficking connections but nothing on the scale being suggested in connection to the prison massacres.

Instead, much like in Colombia and Venezuela, much remains vague. In March, military officials spoke of 13 groups along the Ecuador-Colombia border having connections to Mexican organized crime without providing many specifics.

For Arturo Torres, a local journalist with extensive experience covering organized crime in Ecuador, this is nothing new.

“Police investigations have not conclusively shown how the relations between Ecuadorean gangs and Mexican cartels work,” he told InSight Crime.

He blames this on a complete lack of coordination and intelligence work between security forces. “We are so overwhelmed by drug seizures that we have no capacity to lead long-term investigations that would reveal the full connections with Mexican cartels,” he added.

El Mencho's Wife Arrested - What Does it Mean for Jalisco Cartel?

 

El Mencho's Wife Arrested - What Does it Mean for Jalisco Cartel?

The arrest of the wife of CJNG boss El Mencho is being interpreted as a win against the cartel and a significant blow to the group's money laundering ability. But is her capture truly that significant?

On November 15, troops arrested Rosalinda González Valencia, wife of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias "El Mencho," one of Mexico's most powerful drug traffickers and leader of the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG, according to a government press release. Officials said in the release that her arrest – which occurred in Zapopan, Jalisco – was considered a "significant blow to the financial structure of organized crime in the state of Jalisco."

González Valencia, alias "La Jefa" (The Boss), has a significant reputation in the Mexican organized crime landscape in her own right.

González Valencia is the niece of Armando Valencia Cornelio, alias “El Maradona,” founder of the now-extinct Milenio Cartel. González Valencia and her brothers were present from the very early days of the CJNG, as many Milenio members joined with the cartel, according to El País.

Her brothers also founded the criminal group known as the Cuinis, which was reportedly responsible for much of the cartel's finances and money laundering operations. They were considered to be a sister organization of the CJNG for several years until the arrest of numerous members of the González Valencia clan led to the Cuinis no longer functioning as a separate group.

González Valencia was previously arrested in Jalisco in May 2018 on money laundering charges but was freed three months later due to a lack of evidence. She paid a fine of 1.5 million Mexican pesos ($72,000).

InSight Crime Analysis

The González Valencia family was instrumental to the growth of the CJNG, taking control of the financial aspect of the cartel. At the same time, El Mencho led the group in its territorial expansion and feuds with other groups such as the Zetas.

The Cuinis amassed a veritable empire of assets through which to launder millions in criminal profits for the CJNG, including shopping malls, hotels, real estate agencies, restaurants and a tequila company. Their activities were not just limited to Mexico, as the arrests of several González Valencia family members revealed alleged money laundering connections to Brazil and Uruguay.

The wedding of Oseguera Cervantes and González Valencia was another instrumental step in ensuring the early power of the CJNG and the Cuinis.

However, as the CJNG expanded to become a national force across much of Mexico, the Cuinis have not kept up. The arrest of two prominent leaders, Abigael González Valencia, seen as the second-in-command of the CJNG, in 2015 and José González Valencia, alias "El Chepa," have left the group weakened.

With much of the Cuinis membership behind bars and the US government offering up to $10 million for the capture of El Mencho, it may be that the González Valencia was one of the last links between the two.

Oseguera Cervantes has endured as head of the CJNG while many in his family have been arrested, including his son, brother and brothers-in-law. But the arrests don't appear to have had much impact on Oseguera Cervantes' life.

Narcos:Pacho's and Chepe's death scene.

 

How Mexican Cartels Settled in Canada

 

How Mexican Cartels Settled in Canada

The story of the Mexican cartels and their influence abroad has mostly focused on the United States. But a number of Mexican groups have headed farther north, embedding themselves in the Canadian underworld, where they are displacing traditional mafias.

That process has been facilitated by a range of new actors, drug routes and ways of doing business. Among them has been a generational shift in Canadian organized crime, moving away from older, traditional and ethnic-based entities toward a young, tech-savvy and post-ethnic criminal cohort.

Journalists Peter Edwards and Luis Nájera explore this sea change in their recently published book, "The Wolfpack." Following the story of a motley crew of young bikers, street gang members and Italian and Irish mafia, they relate how a brash group of millennial gangsters invited the Sinaloa Cartel into Canada.

InSight Crime spoke with Luis Nájera to discuss the Wolfpack, touching upon how the group shaped the country's organized crime landscape and what Canada represents to Mexican crime groups.

InSight Crime (IC): What exactly was the Wolfpack?

Luis Nájera (LN): It was a criminal alliance responsible for smuggling cocaine to Canada and allegedly to Europe from the Andean region, in partnership with a Mexican drug organization, allegedly the Sinaloa Cartel.

We call it an alliance because this was a new model of criminal association in Canada. Until 2013, the underworld was pretty defined by kinship/ethnicity ('Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra), membership (bikers like the Hells Angels), or geography (local gangs such as the Red Scorpions in Vancouver). In 2013 Vito Rizutto, the “Canadian godfather,” who somehow managed to keep some balance among groups in the East, died. Then, younger criminals broke some unwritten rules and began to associate regardless of affiliation, ethnicity, or location. Among the Wolfpack members, we identified at least one person who was active and in good standing with membership in six different criminal groups.

Also, the flamboyant personality of most of its members broke the old model of flying under the radar. The Wolfpack members liked to dress in expensive clothes, were very aware of their physical appearance and held a very public life that easily exposed them to both rivals and the police.

Among French-language media, the group was initially identified as the "Consortium” but the members of the group themselves self-identified as the Wolfpack.

IC: How did the Wolfpack transform relations between Mexican and Canadian organized crime?

LN: Before the emergence of this new generation of criminals, Mexican groups kept a customer-client relationship with buyers across Canada. Groups like the Wolfpack originally bought the drugs and distributed in Canada to profit, but once Mexican cells came and settled in the country, they handled smuggling and distribution within the country directly, with support on the ground of local criminals. The Wolfpack somehow served as a point of entry for the Mexicans by giving them contacts, access, customers and leverage among other groups, thus paving the way for them to settle here.

IC: More broadly, how has that relationship changed in the last decade?

LN: Again, Mexican groups took control of cocaine, pushing other groups like the Italians to focus on illicit gambling and illicit marijuana. With the Mexican groups controlling the market, they established a model of “warehouse sale," in which they sell to whoever comes to buy, thus creating a “regulated market” that remains under their control. There is some information about the relevance of Canada as a hub for distribution to Europe and Asia that includes both fentanyl and cocaine.

IC: Today, which Mexican groups are present in Canada, where and in what way?

LN: During our research for the book, we identified the Sinaloa Cartel as having a presence across eastern Canada and with a solid control of cocaine, we also got some reports of the Zetas somehow being involved with temporary migrant workers. The Arellano Felix group had a steady relationship with groups in western Canada, particularly in Vancouver, and in the prairies - particularly in Alberta. There is a well-known story of members of the Mennonite community smuggling guns to the South and drugs to the North, taking advantage of the corridor Alberta-Chihuahua-Sonora-Durango.

There are reports of partnerships between Mexican and Asian groups dealing with fentanyl.

IC: Besides cocaine, what other criminal markets are they involved in?

LN: Fentanyl, money laundering and somehow with migrant workers. As I mentioned before, it is not clear if they charge money to the families in Mexico or bring criminals posing as migrant workers either to hide or to keep some kind of control and distribute drugs here.

IC: In recent years, has Canada’s importance to Mexican organized crime increased, stayed roughly the same or decreased? Why?

LN: I would say it has increased since criminal cells moved up north to settle and expand operations here. It is also strategic to have groups operating north of the US border, close to key places such as Chicago and New York, and without the scrutiny of the DEA and rival groups.

IC: What is your prediction for the future involvement of Mexican organized crime in Canada?

LN: I think Mexican groups will continue to expand and consolidate their presence in Canada because of its strategic location, particularly as a trampoline for Europe via the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, as well as the Asian route. Also, Canada offers - ironically - more safety than the United States in terms of rival groups fighting for territory and even for the families of the leadership, while moving across the border is easier than between the US and Mexico. Some years in the future, when the Northwest Passage in the Arctic sea becomes viable, due to global warming, Canada will provide a new route towards Russia. In terms of violence, I think it will remain at similar levels as it is now because it is essential for organized crime groups to maintain a low profile here.

Narcos: Mexico (Season 2) - Sergio Verdín confesses after getting shot [2x02]

Failed Kingpin Strategy at Heart of New US-Mexico Security Plans

Failed Kingpin Strategy at Heart of New US-Mexico Security Plans

The United States and Mexico have officially entered a new phase of their partnership to tackle transnational organized crime groups and the evolving regional drug trade, yet recent announcements suggest the two countries are relying on some of the same failed strategies.

Mexico’s Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard met with US government officials December 14 to mark the official start of the Bicentennial Framework, according to a government press release. First announced in early October during a “high-level security dialogue,” the plan proposes a “new shared vision of regional security and collaboration.”

In particular, it aims to prevent substance abuse using a public health focus; reduce arms trafficking through enhanced tracing and investments in better technology; improve information sharing to dismantle illicit financial networks; increase cooperation to facilitate extraditions; and target drug labs and precursor chemicals to disrupt illegal supply chains, among other priorities.

Secretary Ebrard said the new initiative signified the two countries were “leaving the Mérida Initiative behind.” Launched in 2007, that multibillion-dollar binational security effort largely failed to improve citizen security, quell violence, reign in corruption or confront the scourge brought on by organized crime groups trafficking in drugs, weapons and other contraband.

A day after the US and Mexican governments started their new security efforts, the State Department announced “significant steps to enhance … efforts to disrupt and deter transnational criminal activity.” Specifically, officials said they would now offer up to $20 million in total to anyone that could provide information leading to the arrests of Sinaloa Cartel members Ovidio Guzmán López, Ivan Archivaldo Guzmán Salazar, Jesus Alfredo Guzmán Salazar and Joaquín Guzmán López.

The four sons of former Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín Guzmán Loera, alias “El Chapo” - now jailed in the United States after being convicted and sentenced to life in prison on a number of criminal charges - are known collectively as “Los Chapitos.” They are currently battling for internal control of the group with Ismael Zamada García, alias “El Mayo,” one of the group’s oldest members.

US authorities also recently upped the reward for help in arresting Aureliano Guzmán Loera, alias "El Guano," the older brother of El Chapo and another major Sinaloa Cartel figure who Los Chapitos are also reportedly at odds with.

In addition, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced new designations to the Rojos and Guerreros Unidos crime groups in Mexico for their role in moving drugs into the United States. In Mexico alone, the US government has pledged up to $50 million for information facilitating the capture of a number of organized crime leaders: "Los Chapitos" and "El Mayo" of the Sinaloa Cartel; Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias "El Mencho," of the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG); among others.

Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador said that capturing El Chapo's sons is a "priority," and if they're in Mexico, it should be the responsibility of Mexican authorities to bring them to justice.

InSight Crime Analysis

US-Mexico security relations may be entering into a new phase on paper, but the targeting of various organized crime groups and leaders with multimillion-dollar rewards and sanctions suggests the plan moving forward will continue to rely in part on a seriously flawed approach: the kingpin strategy.

“The US government is making a big statement by announcing that the first concrete actions taken within the new Bicentennial Framework are a reaffirmation of the kingpin strategy, and it’s very unfortunate,” said Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, an expert on US-Mexico relations and organized crime in Mexico.

Since Felipe Calderón launched an offensive against organized crime groups in 2006 backed by the United States and a shared vision of arresting and extraditing criminal leaders, or what has come to be known as the kingpin strategy, violence in Mexico has surged to unprecedented levels.

“Leadership disruptions - especially due to the targeting of drug 'kingpins' by Mexican and US law enforcement - has contributed to the … pattern of internal schisms and encroachment by rival organizations that has fueled violence,” according to a recent Justice in Mexico report on organized crime and violence in the country.

Not only that, but Mexico’s criminal landscape has fragmented substantially thanks to the outsized focus on crime bosses. The International Crisis Group estimates there are some 200 active criminal groups operating in Mexico today, many of which are factions that have splintered off from once-mighty groups like the Zetas and Beltrán Leyva Organization, only to become incredibly predatory groups in their own right.

Unintended consequences from the heavily militarized kingpin strategy were among the core arguments for needing to completely reform the Mérida Initiative. The Bicentennial Framework promised a shift to addressing the root causes of violence and the public health problem that is substance abuse.

However, at this initial stage it doesn’t appear as if the framework marks a “fundamental change” to the way in which the two countries operate on joint security efforts, according to Jaime López, a security policy consultant and former police official in Mexico. He said it’s possible that direction could change in the future as the plan moves forward, but so far the response seems to be the same scenario with a different name.

Correa-Cabrera agreed, adding that it looks more like a cosmetic change. “It’s the same initiative under a different name, just with makeup,” she told InSight Crime.